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When a legal permanent resident comes to the United States, he
comes with permission, with the hope of starting a new life in this
country, and with the mentality that he will one day be embraced as a
full fledged citizen with all the rights and protections that America
has to offer. Imagine coming to the United States as a legal resident,
but only imagine that you have come right after kindergarten, when
you barely understand the difference between being a citizen and
being a legal resident. From childhood to adulthood, you have
known no other home than America, and consider yourself nothing
else but an American. So when you commit a crime, you expect to
be convicted through due process, and then sentenced to jail, like any
other American. However, imagine instead that after you have
committed a crime, your punishment may entail being kicked out of
this country and having to return to the country you were born in, one
that you barely remember and have had no connection to since you
were a baby. Further, imagine that before your removal hearing, you
are imprisoned. As an American, you would have had the right to a
hearing before being imprisoned, and perhaps have been able to post
bail and get released. However, since you are a legal permanent
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resident, you have no such rights and your freedom can be taken
prior to a removal hearing, without judicial review.
Demore v. Kim is a case about a twenty six year-old legal
permanent resident named Hyung Joon Kim, who came to the United
States from South Korea when he was six years old.' At the age of
eight, he became a legal permanent resident.2 At age eighteen, Kim
was convicted of first-degree burglary, and, one year later, he was
convicted of petty theft with priors. Because of these two
convictions, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
charged Kim with being "deportable," and held him in prison
pending his removal hearing. Past cases have held that when an
alien has committed crimes that render him deportable under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c), due process affords him the right to a bail hearing
which allows for his release pending deportation proceedings, so long
as he is neither dangerous nor a flight risk.5 This case has changed
the law so that now legal permanent residents do not need to get such
a bail hearing. If an alien commits certain types of crimes, the INS
has the authority to mandatorily detain him prior to his removal
hearing, and he is not given an individualized review to determine
1. Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003).
2. Id. at 1712.
3. Id.
4. Id. In Justice Souter's dissent, he clarifies that being "deportable" is
different than being ordered "deported." Id. at 1728. The Immigration and
Nationality Act uses "deportable" in many ways. One way describes "classes of
aliens who may be removed if the necessary facts are proven," and another way the
word is used is to "describe aliens who have actually been adjudged as being in the
United States unlawfully." Id. at 1727-28; see also, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (West,
WESTLAW through 2001 legislation), 1229(b) (West, WESTLAW, through 1996
legislation). Kim is the first type of deportable alien because no final order for his
removal has been made. Id. at 1729.
5. Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that detainment of a
legal permanent resident convicted for harboring an illegal alien, without affording
the legal resident a bail hearing, was a violation of his due process rights); Welch v.
Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that mandatory detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1226 is unconstitutional as applied to a legal permanent resident who was
convicted of illegally carrying a firearm); Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247 (10th
Cir. 2002) (holding that the mandatory detainment of a legal permanent resident
convicted for two counts of aggravated robbery violated his substantive due
process rights).
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whether he is dangerous or poses a flight risk.6
This paper will discuss the Court's decision to deny a legal
permanent resident the opportunity for judicial review prior to his
removal hearing. First, I will explore the development of law
governing detainment of deportable aliens.7 Then I will explain the
case history of Kim.8 Next, I will discuss the majority and concurring
opinions of the Court, using the dissent and other authorities as a
critical analysis of the opinions.9  Last, I will examine the




Several pieces of legislation passed over the years gave rise to 8
U.S.C. § 1226. In 1917, Congress stated for the first time that if an
alien commits a serious offense within the first five years of arriving
in the United States, then there are grounds for deportation.'' Next,
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 added "crimes of moral
turpitude" as grounds for deportation. 12  The Immigration and
Control Act of 1986 required the INS to start deportation proceedings
against criminal aliens as fast as possible after they are convicted.' 3
6. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1722.
7. See infra discussion Part II and accompanying notes.
8. See infra discussion Part III and accompanying notes.
9. See infra discussion Part IV and accompanying notes.
10. See infra discussion Part V and accompanying notes.
11. See S. REP. No. 64-352, at 390 (1916) (citing Immigration Act of 1917,
ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874); see also Cabral v. I.N.S., 15 F.3d 193, 194 (1st Cir. 1994)
(stating that the Act was the first to permit the deportation of resident aliens who
were convicted of crimes of moral turpitude).
12. See Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1712 (2003). This Act
states that an alien will be deported who is: "(1) convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude committed within five years of entry and sentenced to confinement
for a year or more, or (2) convicted of two or more crimes involving moral
turpitude, not arising from a single action, at any time after entry regardless of
whether confined." Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414,
66 Stat. 163 (1952).
13. Immigration and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 701(i), 100
Stat. 3359 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000)).
116 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 24-1
This led to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 which set limits on the
Attorney General's discretion so that aliens convicted of aggravated
felonies would be mandatorily detained.' 4  In 1990, Congress
broadened the definition of an aggravated felony, and thus more
aliens became subject to mandatory detention. 15 At the same time, 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) was passed, allowing the Attorney General to
give preferential treatment to permanent resident aliens, releasing
them prior to their removal hearings if they did not pose a flight risk
or a danger to the community. 16 However, in response to several
House and Senate Hearing Reports expressing concerns over the
INS's inability to deport criminal aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 was
enacted.17 This statute required the Attorney General to detain aliens
who had committed certain crimes pending their removal hearings. 18
It was this statute that was upheld as constitutional in Kim, despite
arguments that it deprived legal permanent residents of their due
14. Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988)
(amending 8 U.S.C § 1252(a) (2000)).
15. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1716. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 both limited the rights of aliens and "expanded the reach of the mandatory
detention provisions." Developments in the Law: Plight of the Tempest-Tost:
Indefinite Detention of Deportable Aliens, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1915, 1920 (2002)
(citing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.). This legislation was passed in response to the Oklahoma City bombing of
1995 and it restricted the rights of aliens despite the fact that the attacker in that
bombing was an American citizen. Id.
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2000).
17. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1715.
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (West, WESTLAW through 1996 legislation); see also
Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002). Hoang states that
crimes to which the mandatory detention provision applies include:
murders, rapes, crimes of terrorist activity, violations of the controlled
substances and firearms laws, and crimes committed by repeat
offenders... crimes of moral turpitude with a sentence of one year in
prison, theft offenses with a term of imprisonment of one year or
more, fraud, tax evasion, assisting document fraud in some cases, and
pejury.
Hoang, 282 F.3d at 1260.
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process rights.
B. Legislative History
Laws dealing with the deportation of criminal aliens arose in the
wake of disturbing statistics revealed in a Senate report which
discussed criminal aliens. It was estimated that millions of dollars are
spent by the government on these aliens on a yearly basis.' 9 This
report stated that criminal aliens make up 25% of the population in
federal prisons, and this number has been steadily growing since the
1980's.20 Adding the number of aliens in state prisons, there are
about 53,000 criminal aliens currently doing time in the Untied
States. 2' When aliens on parole, probation, or in local jails are
included, the number reaches 450,000.22 These aliens were estimated
to cost the government and tax payers approximately $724,000,000
in 1990.23
This Senate report called for a simplification of immigration laws
dealing with criminal aliens and proposed more limited levels of
appeals and delays since criminal aliens had already been afforded
due process through the criminal law system before their
convictions. 24 In discussing detainment specifically, the report stated
that the problems with "undetained criminal aliens who fail to appear
... would be lessened if the INS detained more criminal aliens."
25
This Senate report traced back through past legislation that
19. S. REP. No. 104-248, at 1 (1995).
20. Id. The federal prison held approximately 22,000 aliens, and this made up
about 25% of the total prison population in 1989. Id.
21. Id. at 6.
22. Id. at 7. A 1992 Survey by the National Institute of Corrections revealed
that the states most burdened by alien prisoners are: "California (10,575, 10.4
percent of prison population); New York (7,168, 12.4 percent of prison
population); Florida (3,313, 7 percent of prison population); Illinois (2,912, 1
percent of prison population) and Texas (2,187, 4.3 percent of prison population)."
Id. at 9 (citing a 1992 unpublished report, National Institute of Corrections).
23. Id. This number is quite conservative because it does not include the
"substantial costs associated with law enforcement investigations, prosecutions,
judicial proceedings, probation, parole and deportation proceedings." Id.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id. at 4.
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influenced our nation's current laws dealing with criminal aliens. 26 It
stated that past provisions had a "clear intention . . . to prevent the
very worst of the criminal aliens from further endangering the public
and from being able to flee before deportation., 27 However, laws
regarding criminal aliens were passed in a "piecemeal fashion," and
there had been no "major immigration legislation" which "focused
exclusively on the problem ....
This report attacked several aspects of the agency's handling of
criminal aliens. First, there was the issue of limited detention space
which forces the INS to release aliens. 29 The released aliens then fail
to show up for their deportation hearings, thereby escaping removal
entirely. According to the INS reports, 20% of the aliens who were
convicted for aggravated felonies did not report to their hearings, and
to make matters worse, the INS made "limited efforts" to find and
arrest these aliens. 30  The Senate report claimed that current
immigration laws and the deportation system was in "disarray," and
then made several recommendations to better the system.3'
The report recommended "eliminating distinctions among
aggravated and non-aggravated felons, at least for non-resident
26. Id. at 12. According to the legislation, aggravated felons are ineligible for
release under supervision, release under bond, or voluntary departure, unless they
are legal aliens who are not a threat to the community and are likely to appear for
their hearings. Id. (citing the Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
102 Stat. 4181 (1988)).
27. Id. at 12. The sentiment of these reports is clear, "there is just no place in
America for non-U.S. citizens who commit criminal acts here. America has enough
criminals without importing more." Id. at 6.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 23.
30. Id. The 20% of criminal aliens that do not show up for their deportation
hearings is roughly 10, 875 aliens. Id. (citing Hearings on Criminal Aliens in the
United States, Before the PSI 54 (1993)); See also Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1740(2003) (citing the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Case
Hearing Process in the Executive Office for Immigration Review, Rep. No. 1-93-
03, p. 5 (May 1994); Vera Institute of Justice, Testing Community Supervision for
the INS: An Evaluation of the Appearance Assistance Program, pp. ii, 33, 36 (Aug.
1, 2000)) (stating that the Vera Study and the Department of Justice have found
similar statistics for the appearance rate of criminal aliens at their deportation
hearings).
31. Id. at 1.
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aliens." 32 This means that a broader class of alien criminals should
be ineligible for protections given to citizen criminals. The report
added that the threshold for crimes which render an alien deportable
should be lowered so that any felony subjects an alien to
deportation.33 This would make even less serious crimes punishable
by deportation. Finally, it suggested that there should be a
requirement that all aggravated felons be detained while their
deportation proceedings are pending. 34  This was probably the
recommendation that played an instrumental role in developing the
mandatory detention provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
C. Precedential History
The majority relied on several cases to support their decision
upholding the mandatory detention of aliens pending their removal
proceedings. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states
that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . . ."35 In Dred Scott v. Sandford, a case
in which a slave took his owner to court for his freedom, the Court
held that the protections of the Constitution only applied to citizens
of the United States, and "negros" were "not citizens." 36 However,
the Fourteenth Amendment overruled this case when it clearly
granted due process rights to all people in the United States, not just
32. Id. at 31. Even in these reports, a preferential treatment for legal
permanent residents can be seen. When Congress discussed toughening up the
immigration laws for criminal aliens, they noted that these rules are targeted at
illegal aliens, who have no right to be in this country, let alone commit crimes here.
However, the attitude about legal aliens is quite different, as evidenced in the report
which states, that "immigrants to the United States have been, and continue to be,
predominantly hard working and law abiding," but "there appears to be a growing
criminal class among immigrants, especially among those here illegally." Id. at 7.
33. Idat 31.
34. Id. at 32.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
36. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 403-04 (1856). Dred Scott held that
the "negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves,"
cannot "become a member of the political community formed and brought into
existence by the Constitution of the United States" because "they . . . are not
included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States." Id.
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citizens.3 7  In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, this Court held that everyone
within the boarders of the United States, citizen or not, was protected
by the Fifth Amendment. 38 In Yamataya v. Fisher, this Court held
that due process rights extend to aliens in their deportation
proceedings. 39
In 1896, the Court decided Wong Wing v. United States, a case
concerning punishment for criminal aliens who were sentenced to
hard labor in the United States before they would be deported to
China.40 The Court held that aliens had due process rights to a jury
trial before sentencing. At the same time, the Wong Wing Court
made some broad statements about the rights of aliens during their
deportation proceedings. It held that "detention . . . as part of the
means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or
expulsion of aliens, would be valid."'4  Further, it was stated that
"detention is a usual feature of every case of arrest on a criminal
charge," and it "is not imprisonment in a legal sense., 42
In Carlson v. Landon, the Court specifically discussed the due
process issues implicated in the mandatory detainment of criminal
aliens.43 It was held that the detainment of criminal aliens does not
violate due process even when aliens are not afforded a bail hearing
to determine their flight risk.44 The Court stated that the Attorney
General has discretion to deny bail, and as long as his decision is
justified, it satisfies due process even when the alien does not get an
individualized review.45
37. Jim Rosenfeld, Deportation Proceedings and Due Process of Law, 26
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 713, 726-27 (1995).
38. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
39. Yamata v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (stating that the "deportation of an
alien without provision for such a notice and for an opportunity to be heard was
inconsistent with the due process of law required by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.") Id. at 99-100.
40. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
41. Id. at 235
42. Id.
43. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 541-42. The Court found justification for the detention of
Communist aliens based on their threat to national security. Id. When dealing
with alien Communists.. .because of Congress' understanding of their attitude
toward the use of force and violence, the government is not expected to show
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In Reno v. Flores, the Court specifically addressed detainment of
aliens who were "suspected of being deportable. ' 46 It was held that a
regulation which permitted detained juvenile aliens to be released
only to their "(i) a parent; (ii) a legal guardian; or (iii) an adult
relative," was not a violation of their due process rights.47
The Court's recent decision in Zadvydas v. Davis sheds light on
the due process issues surrounding detainment.48 In this case the
Court held that detaining aliens after they have already been ordered
removed is unconstitutional when it lasts longer than 90 days.49 The
dissenting opinion in Zadvydas pointed out studies which reflected
high recidivism rates for released criminal aliens that were out on
bail pending their deportation hearings.50 Also, the dissent stated that
an alien's criminal record is a good indicator of his potential to be
dangerous in the future.5" Therefore, there is justification for denying
certain types of criminal aliens the opportunity to post bail pending
their removal hearings. 52
III. CASE HISTORY
This case involves a twenty six year-old South Korean man
named Kim who came to the United States at the age of six and
became a lawful permanent resident two years later, at age eight.53 In
1996, at the age of eighteen, Kim was convicted of first degree
specific acts in order to comply with due process standards because there is
"reasonable apprehension of hurt from aliens charged with a philosophy of
violence against this Government." Id.
46. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 299 (1993).
47. Id. at 297 (quoting 8 CFR § 242.24(b)(1) (1992)).
48. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
49. Id.
50. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1718 (holding that past criminal convictions are the
"personal activity" that this Court found to be a relevant factor in determining an
alien's dangerousness in Zadvydas).
51. Id. at 1715. In a study from 1986, it was shown that, "after criminal aliens
were identified as deportable, 77% were arrested at least once more and 45%--
nearly half--were arrested multiple times before their deportation proceedings even
began." Id. (citing Hearing on H.R. 3333 Before the Subcommittee on Immigration,
Refugees, and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 54, 52 (1989)).
52. Id.
53. See id. at 1711-12.
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burglary, and then one year later he was convicted for petty theft with
priors. 54  Because Kim's two crimes involved moral turpitude, 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c) authorized the INS to detain him as a deportable
alien once he finished serving his sentence.55
Kim challenged the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and
filed a habeas corpus action in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California. 56 He argued that his due process
rights had been violated when he was detained by the INS without a
hearing to determine whether or not he "posed a danger to society" or
was a "flight risk.",57
The District Court held for Kim, stating that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
was unconstitutional because it allowed the INS to detain aliens
without first affording them a bail hearing. 58 The Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's decision that Kim had a constitutional
right to a bond hearing before being detained by the INS prior to his
removal hearing. 59 The Court of Appeals said that 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c) is a violation of the "substantive due process" rights of legal
permanent residents, who are the "most favored category of aliens." 60
The court held that Kim was not a flight risk because he may not be
"ultimately" deported if he prevailed at his removal hearing, and also
that the nature of his crimes did not make him a danger to society. 61
Therefore, the court stated that the INS did not have sufficient
"justification" for detaining Kim, denying him the opportunity to post
bail, and thereby violating his "liberty interests." 62 The Supreme
Court then granted certiorari to hear this case.
54. Id. at 1712.
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2003).
56. See Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1712.
57. Id. at 1713.
58. Id. The district court ordered INS to provide Kim a hearing to determine
whether or not he posed a danger to society or a flight risk. After a bond hearing
which determined Kim was neither a flight risk nor a danger to society, he was




62. Id. at 1712.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
A. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
1. Concurrence
In the concurring opinion written by Justice O'Connor, in which
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join, she does not agree with the
majority's view that the Court has jurisdiction to hear this case.63 8
U.S.C. § 1226(e) states that the "[t]he Attorney General's
discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall
not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or
decision ...regarding the detention or release of any alien or the
grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole. '64 Justice O'Connor
states that the language of 8 U.S.C. 1226(e) precludes judicial review
since it clearly says that the Attorney General's decision regarding
the denial of a bond hearing cannot be set aside by any court.
Though she recognized the longstanding requirement that Congress
must make a clear statement in order to preclude habeas review, she
argues that they have made such a clear statement in the language of
the statute. Justice O'Connor also accepts that there is a "strong
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action,"
which serves as a check on the three branches of government.65
However, she still argues that Congress's intentions to preclude
habeas challenges like Kim's "could not be clearer" than they were
stated in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). 66
Justice O'Connor further states that aliens have not routinely
relied on habeas actions to challenge their detention without a bail
hearing. 67 She relies on Reno v. American- Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., and states that the Court never said a statute would be limited
depending on what grounds are raised by an alien, and that judicial
63. Id.
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2003).
65. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1723.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1726. Justice 0' Conner explains that the specific issue addressed in
Kim concerns the constitutionality of detention pending removal proceedings, and
that question has only been brought to this Court twice. Id. In Reno v. Flores and
Carlson v. Landon, this Court held that such detention is not a violation of due
process.
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review should not be allowed just because Kim argues that the statute
is unconstitutional.68  Justice O'Connor construes Congress's
language as clearly prohibiting the Supreme Court from reviewing
decisions of mandatory detainment, despite the fact that they may
implicate habeas challenges. She adds that the majority has put
"artificial limitations" on the "broad scope" of the statute. 69
Justice O'Connor also disagrees with the argument that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(e) violates the Suspension Clause which protects the Writ of
Habeas Corpus.7° She claims the Clause protects only those habeas
challenges that existed in 1789, and at that time, an alien in Kim's
position would "not have been permitted to challenge his temporary
detainment. '71 Even in the 19t and early 20 centuries, when the
Court did consider habeas challenges regarding exclusion or
deportation, there were no cases which challenged temporary
detainment.72 Though Justice O'Connor brings up many points
which imply that that Suspension Clause does not protect the habeas
challenge in Kim's case, at the end of her concurrence, she chooses
not to "decide the thorny question" of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)
68. Id. at 1724-25. The language of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) is similar to the
restrictive language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which effectively precluded judicial
review in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC). Reno
v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 473 (1999). In
American-Arab, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) brought an action against the Immigration and Naturalization Services
(INS) because they felt they had been targeted for deportation. Id. In this case, the
Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which restricted "judicial review of the
Attorney General's 'decision or action' to 'commence proceedings, adjudicate
cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act,"' precluded the
Court from reviewing their case. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1996)).
69. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1725.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1724. Justice O'Connor states that early in America's history, there
was little restriction on immigration. Id. Privileges have just recently been given
to aliens contesting deportation, and the most comparable case law from the 18th
century has "gone far in supporting" the "executive authority of a colony" to
exclude or expel aliens who have "no absolute right" to stay in this country." Id.;
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893). Fong Yue Ting
held that the power of congress "to expel . . . [aliens], from the country, may be
exercised entirely through executive officers; or congress may call in the aid of the
judiciary to ascertain any contested facts on which an alien's right to be in the
country has been made by congress to depend." Id.
72. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1726.
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violates the Suspension Clause.73
2. Majority
In Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, in which Justice
Kennedy joins in full, and Justice Souter, Justice Stevens, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join in part, he stated that this Court has
jurisdiction to hear Kim's case. 74 The justices rely on this Court's
statement in Webster v. Doe, and argue that when Congress intends
to "preclude judicial review of constitutional claims, its intent to do
so must be clear., 75  In this case, Justice Rehnquist argues that
Congress has not been clear enough to preclude review.
Further, Kim is not challenging a decision by the Attorney
General about his detention, but instead he is challenging the statute
itself, which allows for his detention without a bond hearing.76
Justice Rehnquist relies on past decisions of this Court that have held
habeas challenges reviewable despite Congress's broad statements to
preclude judicial review.77 The majority of the justices agreed that in
this particular case, Congress's language in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) was
not clear enough to bar review of Kim's habeas challenge. There
was no "explicit provision barring habeas review," and so the
Justices agreed that the Court has jurisdiction to review Kim's case. 78
A concern in this case is whether Congress has stepped over the
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1714; See Webster v. Doe 486 U.S 592, 603 (1988); See also
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974) (holding that there must be clear
and convincing evidence of Congress' intent in order to preclude judicial review).
76. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1714.
77. Johnson, 415 U.S. at 373-74 (holding that in the Section at issue, "neither
the text nor the scant legislative history...provides the 'clear and convincing'
evidence of congressional intent required by this Court before a statute will be
construed to restrict access to judicial review"); Webster, 486 U.S. at 603 (stating
that Congress's intent to preclude judicial review must be clear and "heightened
showing" by Congress is required to "avoid the 'serious constitutional question'
that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a
colorable constitutional claim.").
78. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1714. Similarly, in INS v. St. Cyr, this court held that
since the provision at issue in that case did not explicitly mention habeas review, it
did not have the "sufficient clarity to bar jurisdiction pursuant to the general
habeas." INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13 (2001).
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constitutional limits in implementing its immigration authority.7 9
This gives rise to a discussion about the interplay between the powers
vested in the Executive and Judicial branches of government. The
majority brings forth the point that in 1907 a statutory provision was
enacted, which gave Executive officials the "discretion" on "bail
decisions."80 However, prior to that year, there were many instances
of "judicial grants of bail. 81 In the dissenting opinion, Justice Souter
also agrees with the majority's holding that the Court has authority to
hear Kim's case. He adds that throughout history, the decision to
grant bail was placed "in the hands" of the agency, but there was still
"general availability of judicial relief from detention pending
deportation proceedings." 82  Despite the opinions of Justice
O'Connor, there has indeed been a history of habeas actions which
left the ultimate decision of an alien's detainment in the hands of the
judiciary. The majority opinion reflects the current trend of law,
which is that without a very clear statement of intent, Congress
cannot be interpreted to preclude judicial review of habeas
challenges.
B. The Joseph Hearing
1. Majority
The issue of a Joseph hearing is addressed by both the majority
and the dissent. When an alien commits either an aggravated felony
or any two crimes involving moral turpitude, he falls within the reach
79. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1734.
80. Id. at 1737.
81. Id.
82. Id. In US ex rel Turner, an anarchist alien contested his exclusion from the
United States and claimed that it was unconstitutional. United States ex rel. Turner
v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 283 (1904). Pending his appeal to the Supreme Court,
the lower court released the alien on bail. Id. Further, in Fong Yue Ting v. U.S.,
this Court held that it was constitutional for the agency to require Chinese laborers
to carry paperwork and proof of their residency, and though the laborers were
aliens, they were able to post bail pending their appeal. Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 704 (1893). See also, United States v. Moy Yee Tai, 109 F. 1
(2nd Cir. 1901) (allowing Chinese aliens to post bail pending their deportation
hearings); and In re Lum Poy, 128 F. 974, 975 (C.C. Mont. 1904) (holding that the
practice has been to allow aliens to post bail pending their appeals and deportation
proceedings).
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of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).83 According to this statute, the alien is then
subject to mandatory detention, without the opportunity to get a bail
hearing. 84 The Joseph hearing is a form of protection for those aliens
who want to argue that their prior convictions do not fall within the
category of those punishable by mandatory detention and potential
removal from the United States, and therefore they do not fall within
the reach of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).85 An alien who argues this
immediately gets a Joseph hearing to determine whether or not he
was fairly subject to mandatory detention.
Both the majority opinion written by Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, explain that since Kim conceded he
was deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) based on his convictions,
there is "no occasion" to determine whether or not Joseph hearings
provide enough protection for those who may have been improperly
detained by the INS under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).86 Justice Rehnquist
states that Kim does not dispute his prior convictions, nor does he
argue that he is not subject to mandatory detention by the INS.87
Instead Kim only argues that § 1226(c) itself violates due process
because the INS did not determine he posed a danger to society or a
flight risk before they detained him. 88 The majority reasons that
since Kim conceded that he is deportable under § 1226(c) based on
his two prior convictions of moral turpitude, he "forwent" a Joseph
hearing. 89 Because Kim only filed a habeas action which claims that
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) itself is unconstitutional, the Court refused to
provide him with an individualized review to determine whether or
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2003).
84. § 1226(e).
85. In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (1999). In this case a Haitian permanent
resident was convicted of obstructing and hindering justice when he ran from a
police officer. Id. The INS charged him with committing an aggravated felony, and
mandatorily detained him pending deportation hearings. Id. The court held that
"regulatory history indicates that this rule was intended to provide 'for an
individualized hearing on whether an alien in custody actually falls within a
category of aliens subject to mandatory detention."' Id. (citing 63 Fed. Reg. at 27,
444).
86. Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1712, 1722 (2003).
87. Id. at 1712.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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not he was properly subject to mandatory detention.90  Justice
Kennedy, in his concurrence, also states that Kim could have had an
individualized review in which he would have been "considered...for
release under the general bond provisions" had he first utilized, and
then prevailed in a Joseph hearing. 91 Justice Rehnquist states that the
"real issue" in this case is not whether Kim is deportable, nor
whether the Joseph hearing generally provides sufficient protection
for aliens facing removal, but that the sole issue in this case is
whether or not § 1226(c) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 92
2. Dissent
In Justice Souter's strong dissent, he states that the majority
overlooks the fact that Kim has always contested his removability
from the United States, and has argued that he is "eligible for
statutory relief from removal. 93 The majority says that Kim should
have raised these arguments, but had he done so in this habeas corpus
petition, the "District Court would probably have dismissed the claim
as unexhausted" because these issues must be "submitted in the first
instance to an immigration judge."94 The immigration judge had not
yet held a hearing on Kim's removability when this habeas petition
was filed with the District Court, "though Kim had been detained for
over three months."95 Therefore, Kim has never conceded that he is
90. Id. at 1713.
91. Id. at 1722 (citing In re Joseph, 22 1. & N. Dec. 799, 809 (1999)).
92. Id. at 1717
93. Id. 1727
94. Id.; 8 U.S.C. 1229a(a)(3) (states under "[e]xclusive procedures," that
"[U]nless otherwise specified in this chapter, a proceeding under this section shall
be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be
admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from
the United States.").
95. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1727; 8 U.S.C.1231(a)(1)(A) (2000) (stating that
"[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered removed,
the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period
of 90 days."). This statute and three month time limit on detention is inapplicable in
Kim's case because it deals with aliens who have already been ordered removed,
and are waiting for their native countries to take them back. See Kim, 123 S. Ct. at
1727. However, it does call into question the fact that while aliens who have
already been ordered removed are afforded protection through a detention
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deportable, and conversely he is challenging his removability before
an administrative judge. Kim is simultaneously challenging
mandatory detention under Section 1226(c) in the federal court
system. As a result, there is no concession that he is accepting
deportation.
Even if Kim is held to be deportable under Section 1226(c),
meaning that his convictions do fall within the realm of those
punishable by deportation, this by no means implies that he will
positively be deported. Kim is still contesting the "sufficiency of his
criminal convictions as a basis for removal," and no "final order of
removal" has occurred since his case has not yet been reviewed by an
immigration judge.96
Another point that Justice Souter brings up is that a Joseph
review would only let Kim show that he does not fit within the
statutory scheme of Section 1226(c), meaning Kim could only argue
that his convictions were neither aggravated felonies nor crimes of
moral turpitude, and therefore he should not be mandatorily
detained.97 However, Kim's argument in this case is of a different
nature. He is claiming that even if he did commit crimes that fit in
either of the two aforementioned categories, the statute as a whole
which allows for his mandatory detention without individualized
review, is a violation of due process.
3. Concurrence
Justice Breyer addressed this issue as well. He states that if Kim
conceded he was deportable, then he can be detained without a
judicial review for the short time it takes to conduct a formal
hearing. 98 However, Kim does not contend he is deportable, and
instead he argues that his past convictions are not the type that would
render him subject to mandatory detention and deportability. Despite
the fact Kim did not utilize the Joseph hearing, Justice Breyer states
limitation, aliens like Kim who are waiting for their final orders and still retain
their legal status are not afforded such a time limit for their detention.
96. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1728. In his brief, Kim states that "he intends to assert
that his criminal convictions" of first degree burglary and petty theft with priors are
not "removable offenses," and so he is "eligible for statutory relief from removal."
Id. at 1727.
97. In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (1999).
98. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1746.
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that if Kim is not dangerous nor a flight risk, due process still affords
him the right to bail. 99 Depriving Kim of this right to a bail hearing
is a violation of our Constitution.
Justice Breyer suggests using the bail standards from criminal
law which state that a bail hearing should be allowed if it is not
requested to "cause delay," if there is a "substantial issue of law or
fact," and if the criminal defendant shows "by clear and convincing
evidence that he is not likely to flee or pose a danger" to society. 00
The criminal law standards take into account the important
governmental interests in detaining aliens, but they do not impede on
the due process rights of the alien.' 0' So long as the criminal law bail
standards are met, the government should allow Kim to get an
individualized assessment of flight risk and dangerousness.
C. Due Process Issues
1. Majority
The majority opinion holds that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) authorizes
mandatory detention of certain types of deportable aliens prior to
their removal hearing, and Kim falls within the reach of this statute
based on his prior convictions. 0 2 Further, the short time that Kim
would be subject to detainment prior to his removal hearing does not
constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
99. Id. at 1747. Justice Breyer states that "immigration statutes, interpreted in
light of the Constitution, permit Kim (if neither dangerous nor a flight risk) to
obtain bail." Id. Further, he adds that the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) allows the
Attorney General "to take into custody, any alien who ... is deportable." Id. He
does not interpret this to mean that an alien who may or may not be deported can
be taken into custody without a bail hearing. Id.
100. Id. 1747.
101. Id. Justice Breyer suggests using the criminal law standards to determine
if bail should be allowed for several reason: 1) they give "considerable weight to
any special governmental interest in detention," and address flight risk and
"process-related" issues, 2) "[t]he standards are more protective" of the "alien's
liberty interests than . . . the [Immigration and Naturalization Service's] Joseph
hearings," and 3) the statute does not prohibit using them when an alien's
"deportability is in doubt," as it is in Kim's case because no final order for removal
as been made. Id.
102. Id. at 1717.
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Amendment. 10 3 Though Justice Rehnquist acknowledges that aliens
are entitled to due process protection during their deportation
hearings, he states that detention during these proceedings is
"constitutionally valid."' 1 4  Also, he relies on the decisions in
Carlson and Flores to determine that individual findings which
support the detention of an alien prior to his removal hearings are not
required. 0 5
Justice Rehnquist relies on Mathews v. Diaz, and states that the
Court has accepted "Congress may make rules as to aliens that would
be unacceptable if applied to citizens."'' 0 6  This means that such
mandatory detention without the opportunity for a bail hearing would
be unacceptable if it was applied to a citizen, but since Kim is a legal
permanent resident, he is not afforded similar protections. Justice
Rehnquist relies on the Carlson case in which aliens, like Kim,
challenged the constitutionality of their detainment. The Court held
that these aliens, who had communist ties, could be detained "even
without any finding of flight risk." 107
Justice Rehnquist also relies on this Court's decision in Flores,
where a class of juvenile aliens contested their detainment during
their deportation hearings.'0 8 The INS only wanted to release these
juvenile aliens to responsible adults.'0 9 The juvenile respondents
claimed that their detainment was a due process violation, but the
Court rejected their challenge. The Court stated that "reasonable
presumptions and generic rules ... are not necessarily impermissible
exercises of . . . power," and the amount of individualized review
103. Id. at 1722.
104. Id. at 1717.
105. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292
(1993).
106. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1716. Justice Rehnquist refers to Mathews v. Diaz, a
case in which this Court held that there was no due process violation where
Congress required aliens to be citizens for at least five years before they became
eligible for a federal medical program. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 US 67, 79-80 (1976).
107. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1718; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (holding
that the Communist aliens could be detained without an individualized review of
their flight risk); see also text accompanying note 45.
108. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1719; Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
109. Flores, 507 U.S. at 299 (holding that there was no due process violation
in detaining juvenile aliens suspected of being deportable until a "parent," "adult
relative," or "legal guardian" was located to take custody of them).
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given to the juveniles was sufficient.' 10
Next, the majority differentiates Kim's case from the Court's
prior holding in Zadvydas, a case that the dissent and other courts
have relied on when holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) is
unconstitutional."' Justice Rehnquist states that in Zadvyas, the
aliens had already been through their removal proceedings, so further
detainment served no immigration purpose, and therefore it violated
due process. "2  The purpose to detain is to prevent aliens from
"fleeing prior to their removal."' 13  The goal of deportation in
Zadvydas was "no longer practically attainable" since the aliens had
already gone through removal proceeding, been ordered removed, but
their native country was refusing to allow them re-entry. 114
Continued detention in Zadvydas, past the ninety day statutory
removal period, was held to be a violation of due process." 15
Zadvydas is materially different than Kim's case because it deals
with the detention of aliens who have already been given a final order
of removal at their hearings. In stark contrast, Kim's detention is still
serving a purpose because holding him prior to his removal hearing
ensures he will not flee before that hearing." 16
The majority opinion differentiates Zadvyas from Kim's case in
another way as well. It states that while Kim's detention is a lot
shorter, the detention at issue in Zadvyas was "indefinite" and
"potentially permanent."'" 7  While detention prior to a removal
hearing usually lasts no more than 90 days, detainment post removal
110. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1719.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1719-20.
113. Id. at 1720
114. Id. at 1720; See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (holding that
there was a violation of due process when an alien native of Germany and an alien
native of Cambodia were held for over 90 days after they had already been ordered
removed).
115. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 702.
116. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1720. The majority makes a point to focus on the
importance of an alien appearing for his removal hearing. Id. Justice Rehnquist
justifies detention pending removal hearings by relying on studies which indicate
that a significant percent of aliens released on bail skip their removal hearings.
117. Id.; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690-91; See Alicia Brown, Striking a Balance:
The Conflict between Safety and Due Process Rights-The Practical Implications of
Zadvydas v. Davis, 22 J. NAT'L AsS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGEs 429 (2002).
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hearings has "no obvious termination point."' 18 For the reasons
stated above, the majority held that Kim's mandatory detainment did
not violate due process, and they reversed the decision of the Court




In Justice Souter's powerful dissent, in which Justice Ginsburg
and Justice Stevens join, he argues that it has been long established
that "all aliens within our territory are ... entitled to the protection of
the Due Process Clause."'' 20  He states that there is a "century of
precedent acknowledging the rights of permanent residents" and
these rights include "the basic liberty from physical confinement"
which lay "at the heart of due process."' 2' Since there has been no
final order for Kim's removal, he is entitled to the full protections of
due process that a legal permanent resident holds.' 22 Justice Souter
discusses the various immigration preferences, economic freedoms,
and attachments to the United States that legal permanent residents
possess. 123  He explains that, for the most part, their lives are
"indistinguishable" from those of regular citizens; they pay taxes,
males are required to register for the military, they support the
economy, and contribute to society in enumerable ways. 124 Further,
attachments to this country are much more intense for legal
permanent residents like Kim, who come to America as children and
have little or no connection to their country of citizenship.' 25 The
dissent relies on case law which has repeatedly extended greater due
process protections to legal permanent residents than any other class
118. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1720; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697.
119. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1722.
120. Id. at 1728.
121. Id. at 1727; See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that
all people within the United States are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, a
decision handed down over a century ago).
122. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1727.
123. Id. at 1728.
124. Id. at 1729.
125. Id.
134 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 24-1
of aliens. 12
6
The majority quotes Mathews in its assertion that rules applicable
to aliens would not be acceptable if applied to citizens. However, the
dissent clarifies that Mathews was a case involving a federal statute
which "limited eligibility for a federal medical insurance program" to
citizens and legal permanent residents that have been residing in the
United states for five years.1 27 Justice Souter argues that deportation
and detainment of legal permanent residents is unrelated to the
federal government's authority to regulate its own programs. The
Mathews case never says anything about limiting the due process
rights of legal permanent residents, and therefore it is incomparable
to the issue in Kim's case. In fact, the issue in the Mathews case was
about giving more rights to certain classes of citizens and aliens
when it came to federal medical funding, and in contrast with the
interpretation of the majority, it never supported any limitations on
the liberty interests of any class of aliens. 128
Since this Court has held that due process protections do extend
to legal permanent residents, Kim has a right to be free from arbitrary
126. Id. at 1730 (stating that although LPR's are "subject to federal removal
power, that power may not be exercised without due process."); See Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (holding that a legal resident alien who left the
United States for a short time and then returned to find herself facing exclusion was
entitled to more rights than aliens who seek initial entry); See Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (holding that "care must be exercised lest the procedure"
through which the resident alien "is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential
standards of fairness").
127. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1730 n.9.
128. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (stating that "Congress
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.").
However, there was no mention about limiting the constitutional rights of legal
permanent residents. By creating a provision that makes aliens who have lived in
the United States for five years eligible for federal benefits, the government was
trying to make more federal services available for this class of aliens who have
become part of the American society. Contrary to the majority's view of Mathews,
the government was not trying to deprive aliens of certain rights in this country.
See also Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 225 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that "once
an alien gains admission to this country and begins to develop the ties that go with
permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.") (citing
Vancouver Women's Health Collective Soc'y v. A.H. Robins Co., 820 F.3d 1359,
1363 (4th Cir. 1987)).
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or capricious detainment that serves no governmental interest.129 The
dissent explains that Kim is entitled to a "hearing and an impartial
decision-maker's finding that detention is necessary to a
governmental purpose."' 3 ° The majority cites Flores, claiming that
detainment of an alien based on generic rules is justifiable, however,
the Flores case concerned juveniles who are always in someone's
custody.' 3 ' The Court refused to release them without being sure that
they would report to court for their immigration proceedings, and
without ensuring they had a parent, guardian, or adult to care for
them.132 In stark contrast, Kim is an adult, and the detainment of "an
adult by the government triggers heightened substantive due process
scrutiny."' 133 The custody and detainment of minor children, who are
the responsibility of the court when there is no appropriate guardian
for them, has nothing to do with the detainment of an adult legal
resident. The dissent calls the detainment of the children in Flores an
issue about "legal custody," while Kim's case presents the issue of
"detention." 134 Flores does not say that the detention of an adult is
justified in all cases; there is no go ahead in Flores to deprive a class
of adult aliens their liberty while they wait for their removal
129. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1736; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 721 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (stating that detention that is not "necessary" to avoid flight risk or
danger to the community is "arbitrary or capricious," and therefore constitutes a
violation of due process).
130. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1731.
131. Id. at 1745. Justice Souter differentiates Kim's case from Flores because
"freedom from physical restraint" was never an issue in that case since "juveniles"
are "always in some form of custody." Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. at 302
(1993)).
132. Id. The Court made a blanket presumption that juveniles could only be
released to certain people, without reviewing each juvenile alien's case. Id.
However, such a presumption was made in the best interests of juveniles whose
safety is the Court's responsibility. Id. This is not the case for adults, so adults
must be afforded due process before they are detained. Flores, 507 U.S. at 302.
133. Id. at 1731; See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (holding that the
State cannot "continue to confine an adult who is not now considered mentally ill,"
for the sole reason that he is deemed dangerous because "the State has not proven
this ground for confinement by clear and convincing evidence"); See also Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (holding that due process was violated when a
mentally handicapped man was facing indefinite confinement because of a pending
indictment against him).
134. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1745.
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hearings.' 35
Neither the dissent nor Kim is arguing for a blanket prohibition
against the detainment of aliens prior to their removal hearings. They
do, however, believe that a weighty governmental interest must be
met in order to justify the detainment. 136 Determining that an alien
poses a flight risk or is dangerous would meet that governmental
interest in detention. However, mandatory detainment without such a
determination is an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.'37 Justice
Souter argues that if the procedural due process requirements could
be "dispensed" as easily as they are in Section 1226(e), then so could
the substantive due process requirements of ensuring a narrow class
of detainees and a limited detention period. 38 In Kim's case, the
statute applies broadly to all aliens "claimed to be deportable for
criminal offenses," and it is not limited to those who are "likely to
flee" or are "dangerous."'' 39 The detention itself is not limited in time
because, although there is a removal proceeding within ninety days,
the alien remains detained through the course of the proceeding
which has "no deadline" and could take over one year. 40  This
135. In Flores, it is stated that the provision which only allows juveniles to be
released to specific individuals does not implicate any liberty interests. 507 U.S. at
302 (stating that "the freedom from physical restraint . . . is not at issue in this
case").
136. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1733. See also Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 1260
(2002) (holding that "[a]lthough the government has a compelling interest in
ensuring that deportable aliens appear for their proceedings, this interest is not
sufficient to justify detention of a lawful permanent resident alien absent an
individualized determination that the alien is in fact a flight risk.").
137. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1733. Justice Souter also states that the "claim of
liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment is at its strongest when government seeks
to detain an individual." Id. at 1731; see Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 310 (3d
Cir. 2001) (stating that after establishing that mandatory detention "implicates
Patel's fundamental right to be free from physical restraint, we must apply
heightened due process scrutiny to determine if the statute's infringement on that
right is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."); see also INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983) (holding that Congress needs to employ "a
constitutionally permissible means of implementing" its plenary power.); see also
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
138. Id.; Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that
mandatory detention in Welch's case leaves no process to implement, and so the
"procedural due process inquiry collapses into the substantive one").
139. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1736.
140. Id. at 1734.
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statute, therefore, invalidates the constitutional protections we have
guaranteed to all those who live within our boarders.
The dissent addresses the Zadvydas case in which this Court held
that a statute which was not limited in the class of aliens it affected,
nor in the length of detention it prescribed, violated due process.
Therefore, the case was remanded and the lower court was ordered to
make individualized determinations of the "sufficiency of the
Government's interests" in detention. 14' In Zadvydas, this Court
stated that due process principals applied to aliens who have already
been ordered to leave the United States. 142 Therefore, there is no
reason that equal, or perhaps more protection should not be afforded
to those legal permanent residents who have not yet been ordered
removed. 143 Kim has more of an interest in avoiding detention and
getting an individualized review because mandatory confinement
impedes his ability to prepare a defense for his upcoming removal
proceeding. 44 This Court has gone to great lengths to ensure due
process in Zadvydas, so there is no justification for failing to apply
the same principles in Kim's case.
The majority relies on studies that concluded that aliens who
were released pending their removal hearings were likely not to show
up for their court dates and also commit more crimes in the
meantime. 145  The dissent responds by saying that recidivism is
already addressed in the normal criminal law scheme through
charges, convictions, and enhanced sentencing for repeat
141. Id.
142. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678.
143. Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 231 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that lawful
permanent residents . . . are entitled to equal, if not greater, constitutional
protections" than other types of aliens).
144. Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1734 (2003) (stating that 8
U.S.C. § 1226(e) "isolates" detained aliens from "their lawyers, witnesses, and
evidence."); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 720 (Kennedy, J., dissenting ) (stating
that the Court should have upheld the detention of the removed aliens, as they had
"no right under the basic immigration laws to remain in this country," and
distinguishing them from "from aliens with a lawful right to remain here.").
145. See supra text accompanying note 116. See Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d
299, 312 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that "[W]e do not downplay the risk that some
criminal aliens might pose to the community or the risk that they might flee before
a final order is issued. But an immigration judge would retain the discretion to
detain any alien who poses such a risk.").
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criminals.146 There is no need to make a blanket presumption against
a broad class of aliens, 147 subjecting them to mandatory detention and
infringing upon their due process rights, only to reduce the chances
of recidivist crime. Even the "Government concedes, Kim's
individual detention serves no Government purpose at all."'
148
Further, Justice Souter explains that the study that reached the
conclusion that released aliens flee or commit more crimes did not
use only legal permanent residents.'49 Therefore, the data from this
study that the majority relies on is inapplicable to Kim.150 Further,
legal permanent residents like Kim, especially those who came to the
146. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1739 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82
(1992)).
147. Since there is such a long and varied list of crimes for which an alien can
be mandatorily detained, "it cannot simply be assumed that persons who have at
one time been convicted of the crimes encompassed by §236(c) 'pose a danger to
the public."' Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002).
148. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1739. See also, United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the
Detention of Asylum Seekers (Feb.1999) (cited in Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1734).
There should be a presumption against detention. Where there are
monitoring mechanisms which can be employed as viable alternatives
to detention.. .these should be appliedfirst unless there is evidence to
suggest that such an alternative will not be effective in the individual
case. Detention should therefore only take place after a full
consideration of all possible alternatives, or when monitoring
mechanisms have been demonstrated not to have achieved the lawful
and legitimate purpose.
Id. n. 10.
149. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1739. The aliens reported in the study were not only
legal residents, but included in the findings were the recidivism and no-show data
for illegals and those aliens who were just visiting the Unites States. Id.
150. Id. Justice Rehnquist states that the studies which concluded that aliens
released pending their deportation hearings where likely to commit more crimes
and fail to report to court where not conducted under the best of conditions. Id. at
1720. He also states that bond hearings were never determined to be "ineffective or
burdensome." Id. Therefore, Justice Souter argues that "supervised release" will
"address recidivism" and at the same time will not deprive aliens of due process in
the way that mandatory detention does. Id. at 1738. He also suggests looking to the
Vera Institute Study, which concluded that 92% of the criminal aliens who were
mostly legal permanent residents and were released under supervision attended all
of their hearings. Id. at 1740 (referring to the Vera Institute of Justice, Testing
Community Supervision for the INS: An Evaluation of the Appearance Assistance
Program, pp. ii, 33, 36 (Aug. 1, 2000)).
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United States at a very young age, have many attachments to the
United States and are unlikely to flee anywhere.15' Also, the aliens in
the study that the majority discusses were not released on bail after
an individual review about their flight risk or dangerousness, but
where released based on whether or not there was room available to
detain them. 152 Therefore, such a study provides no basis for a
decision denying legal permanent residents the right to individualized
review.
The majority cites Carlson and explains that the aliens in that
case had a similar claim to Kim's, but that this Court allowed their
detainment despite the fact that they posed no flight risk.'53
However, unlike in Kim, the Court's decision in Carlson was based
on the aliens' Communist ties. 154 Those aliens posed a danger to
society and that is why their mandatory detainment was justified. 155
Further, even the respondents in Carlson were given judicial review
which determined they were dangerous. 156 The case itself states that
the Court made its decision to allow detainment of the respondents
based on their "understanding [that] ... Communists use[d] force and
violence to accomplish their political aims." 157 Here, no decision
maker has held Kim is dangerous or a flight risk, so there is no
justifiable reason to hold Kim. The majority states that in Carlson,
the Court did not go into individual evaluations of the aliens,
however, this is a misinterpretation of the decision. Justice Souter
points out that the dissent of Carlson found the evidence of the
individual findings of dangerousness unsupported.'58 This does not
151. Id. at 1739
152. Id.
153. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
154. Id. at 541-42.
155. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1744 (stating that it was the Carlson Court's "express
finding that the petitioners in that case were found to be not only members of the
Communist Party, but active in Communist work, and to a degree, minor perhaps
in one case, participants in Communist activities) (citing Carlson, 342 U.S. at 541).
156. Id. at 1743.
157. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 541. (holding that "evidence of membership plus
personal activity in supporting and extending the Party's philosophy concerning
violence gives adequate ground for detention.") (emphasis added).
158. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1744 (clarifying that there was definitely a "finding of
danger," in fact it was a finding that Justice Black described as "unconvincing")
(citing Carlson, 342 U.S. at 541).
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mean that there were no individual findings at all. Instead, it says
that there were individual findings, but just that the dissent felt
evidence of these findings did not support the majority's conclusion
about them. 59 The fact that findings were made is evident, and so
they should be made in Kim's case as well. Further, Justice Souter
states that the Carlson Court believed they were deciding the case
based on individual findings about the aliens, so this Court should not
be using that case to support the idea that a court does not need to
make such individual findings.'1 60
The majority states that an alien in Kim's case is subject to a
limited amount of time in detention. They state that while Zadvydas
presented a case where detention was "indefinite" and "potentially
permanent," Kim's case was different because detention lasted for a
much "shorter duration"' 6 1 However, Justice Souter's dissent states
that detention like Kim's is not limited by the time limit found in the
Speedy Trial Act. 162 Removal hearings have no deadline, they can
go for over a year. 63  But, even if detention prior to a removal
hearing is relatively short, like the majority states, there is still no
reason to allow for it without affording aliens the right to due
process.' 64 Further, it is not a rule that due process applies only to
lengthy deprivations of liberty; it applies to all deprivations of
liberty. 65  Any physical confinement by the government, without
giving the defendant an opportunity for a hearing, raises due process
issues.
3. Concurrence
In the concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy states that if the INS
had detained without "at least some merit to the ...charge," then
159. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 541.
160. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1744.
161. Id. at 1720 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690-91).
162. Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 224 (2002).
163. Id. at 231 (stating that there are "extensive procedural safeguards
attendant to post- removal-period detention," but "these safeguards ... are absent in
§ 1226(c)").
164. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1741. The majority states that the average time of Kim-
type detention is under 90 days, however, there is no standard that detention must
be less than this amount of time. Id.
165. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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there would be a Due Process issue and perhaps Kim could argue that
his rights had been violated. 166  If the delayed detention was
"unreasonable or unjustified," then it would be an "arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.' ' 167  Had the INS failed to "satisfy this
minimal, threshold burden," then Kim should have been entitled to an
individualized review in which it would be determined whether his
detention was really required to either "facilitate deportation, or
protect against risk of flight or dangerousness."' 168 However, Justice
Kennedy states that in this case, the INS has met their burden and so
temporary detention was permissible under due process. 169 He states
that the INS was reasonable and had sufficient justification to
temporarily detain Kim without first giving him an individualized
review. Justice Kennedy agreed with the overall outcome of this




In this case, the Court has decided that legal permanent residents
will not be afforded the same constitutional protections as citizens.
The Court has narrowed the rights of a class of people who are
legally living in the United States, paying taxes, contributing to our
economy, and enriching our society. The decision in Kim makes it
clear that we as a nation are not willing to extend all our
166. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1722.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1734 n. 12. Justice Souter responds to Justice Kennedy's
concurrence and states that:
Justice Kennedy recognizes that the Due Process Clause requires an
individualized determination as to [an LPR's] risk of flight and dangerousness
if the continued detention [becomes] unreasonable or unjustified.. .It is
difficult to see how Kim's detention in this case is anything but unreasonable
and unjustified, since the Government concedes that detention is not necessary
to completion of his removal proceedings or to the community's protection.
Id.
170. Id. at 1722.
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constitutional safeguards to aliens who live among us. In making this
decision, the Court has reneged on prior case law that had established
principles in favor of permanent resident aliens.' 7 ' The impact of this
decision is that legal permanent residents can be imprisoned without
a hearing, then be removed from this country.'72 Since we as a
nation have invited legal permanent residents to our country, it is a
shame that we will fail to offer them the constitutional protections of
this land. Though it has been long established that legal permanent
residents are a special class of aliens, the holding in this case says
otherwise. 73
As our nation becomes more diverse, and our immigrant
population grows, the definition of the 'average American' has and
will continue to change. Most likely, the average person living in
America will be directly affected by this law either because they are a
legal permanent resident, or have family members and friends who
are in this class of aliens. Today, there are approximately 12 to 15
million legal residents currently residing in the United States.17 4 Add
to this number all of their family members and friends, and the math
reveals that a significant portion of our society will feel the blow of
Demore v. Kim. Over the last few years, particularly after September
11, 2001, society's view of the immigrant population have changed,
and this hesitant attitude about immigrants is reflected in our laws.
175
171. Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 224 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that
"incarceration pendente lite of a longtime resident alien with extensive community
ties, with no chance of release and no speedy adjudication rights as in criminal
proceedings, together lead us to conclude that the circumstances of Welch's
detention constitute punishment without trial").
172. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1708.
173. Welch, 293 F.3d at 231 (stating that "[1]awful permanent residents are the
most favored category of aliens admitted to the United States.").
174. S. Rep. No. 104-249, at 5 (1995) (citing INS Statistics Department figures
provided January, 1994).
175. See Alicia Brown, Striking a Balance: The Conflict between Safety and
Due Process Rights-The Practical Implication of Zadvydas v. Davis, 22 J. NAT'L
Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 429, 457 (2002) (stating that after the "events of
September 1 th, 2001, the ramifications of the decision would appear to be even
more far reaching than previously thought . . . the Court's ruling that special
circumstances, such as terrorism, can justify holding an immigrant beyond the
ninety day period has become more important."); See also Mary Jacoby, Al-Najjar
to Appeal Deportation Order to Supreme Court, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov.
16th, 2001, at 4A (discussing that the 11 th Circuit held that an alien who was
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Despite our feelings about immigration policies in the future, we owe
the immigrants who we have welcomed into our country the
protections that our Constitution provides. The holding in this case
represents a different view, and today even society's most esteemed
class of aliens will find that they will be denied the same due process
rights as native born citizens.
B. Judicial
The Court's age-old plenary power doctrine has "entrusted to the
political branches of government," those matters which deal with
immigration. Immigration has been a concept that is "largely
immune from judicial inquiry or interference."' 176 Before this case,
the trend has been that substantive immigration issues, like whether
or not to admit or deport an alien, have been left to agency
discretion.177  However, for procedural matters relating to
immigration, like hearings, the Court has applied the usual
constitutional principles. 178 This case has broken that trend since the
Court decided to leave the procedural issue of a bail hearing in the
hands of the agency. Kim presented an issue that was procedural in
nature, since Kim was arguing that he should have been afforded a
hearing prior to detainment. The Court upheld a statute that allows
an agency to hold an alien without justifying detainment on an
individual level. In doing so, the Court demonstrated that due
process protections will not extend to legal permanent residents.
The impact of this case is that it strengthens the plenary power
doctrine, thus taking away from the principals that established
judicial oversight of certain agency actions. While prior cases had
set up a system in which the agency would be held accountable to
due process standards for its procedural actions, the ruling in Kim
says otherwise. 79 Prior decisions of this Court have narrowed the
suspected of having ties to a terrorist organization cannot be held while waiting to
be deported, despite the special circumstances exception in Zadvyas).
176. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term Leading Cases, CONSTITUTIONAL
LA W, HARV. L. REV. 287 (2003).
177. Id. at 287-88.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 292; see Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 307-08 (2001) (stating that
"[it] is undisputed that Congress has plenary power to create substantive
immigration law to which the judicial branch generally must defer .... However,
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absolute powers of the agency, but this decision broadens these
powers by giving the agency almost total control over immigration.
Due process protects individuals against deprivation of liberty, and
detention is exactly the type of procedural matter that should be
overseen by the judiciary. Even after this decision, three courts,
Ashley v. Ridge, Ly v. Hansen, and Zavala v. Ridge have run into
difficulty applying the principles discussed in Kim. 180 However, the
force of this decision has overall limited the ability of the judiciary to
interfere with agency decisions regarding detention. This case has
constricted the reach of the judicial branch to oversee agency action,
even when the agency presses against constitutional limits.'
8
'
Congress' power is subject to constitutional limitations, including due process
constraints . . ").
180. Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F.Supp.2d 662 (D.N.J. 2003) (holding that an
automatic stay provision, which allowed the Attorney General to invoke a hold on a
legal permanent resident's release, even after an individualized review determined
he should be released, was a violation of the alien's due process rights.); Ly v.
Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 271 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that a refugee whose detention
pending his removal proceedings was not estimated to be "short.. like Kim['s],"
was held to be a violation of due process.); Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F.Supp.2d 1071
(2004) (explaining that a sex offender, who had been given the opportunity to post
bail prior to the date that Section 1226 (c) had become effective, could not now be
detained pursuant to the automatic stay provisions because it would violate due
process.).
181. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). A landmark Supreme
Court case has recently established that even when Congress authorizes the
detention of certain people, like enemy combatants, due process demands that they
be given a "meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention
before a neutral decisionmaker." Id. at 2635. This is a very significant holding for
the American citizens being held indefinitely in Guantanamo Bay without access to
counsel or the opportunity for judicial review. In this case, it is stated that "history
and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the
potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others...." Id. at 2647. It
clarifies that the "Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a
necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an
important judicial check on the Executive's discretion in the realm of detentions."
Id. at 2650. Currently this Court is grappling with Rumsfeld v. Padilla, a case that
concerns an American citizen being detained by the President for terrorist ties,
"without Congressional authorization and judicial oversight." Brief of Amici
Curiae Janet Reno, et al. at 27, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 1904 (2004) (No.
03-1027). This decision will further determine the direction in which our
separation of powers doctrine is going.
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C. Administrative
Although the Court held that there was no due process issue in
Kim, it did not prohibit judicial review of habeas challenges
altogether, like Justice O'Connor interpreted Congress's intention to
be in 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (e). 182  The Court has stated that judicial
review will not be precluded without a clear intent from Congress. 183
The Kim decision held that even the words "no court" in the statute
were not strong enough to overcome the presumption of judicial
review.1 84 In Kim, the Court has upheld the agency's authority over
aliens, but it has reinforced an alien's ability to utilize the protections
embedded in the Joseph hearing, the removal hearing, and the habeas
challenge when applicable.
Despite the availability of judicial review, this case has given the
administrative agency more power than it had been afforded in the
past. In spite of the strong dissent which makes many powerful
points about how the agency has deprived Kim of his due process
rights, and the prior case law which has held procedural agency
decisions to due process standards, this Court upheld the discretion of
the agency regarding detention pending a removal hearing.' 85 The
decision in Kim has supported the authority of agency discretion in
the face of a constitutional challenge, thereby strengthening the force
of the agency to carry out its functions.
182. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1723; see also Yamata v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 98-99
(1903) (stating that "'Congressional action has placed the final determination of the
right of admission in executive officers, without judicial intervention").
183. Id. at 1714 (holding that "where a provision precluding review is claimed
to bar habeas review, the Court has required a particularly clear statement that such
is Congress' intent").
184. Id. at 1723.
185. See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV.
287, 292 (2003); see also Yamata v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). Yamata held that
it is not competent for the Secretary of the Treasury or any executive officer, at any
time within the year limited by the statute, arbitrarily to cause an alien who has
entered the country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a
part of its population, although alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into custody
and deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard upon the questions
involving his right to be and remain in the United States. See Yamata, 189 U.S. 86.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Imagine yourself in the position of Yoon Kim, a man who has
spent the majority of his life believing he is a regular American, and
that the United States is his home. If you were in Kim's position and
had just committed his crimes, you would be deprived of your liberty
and detained in an INS prison without the right to a bail hearing. As
you are being held in jail awaiting the removal proceedings, your
opportunities to meet with your attorney and present a case are
diminishing. The fact remains that if you cannot present a strong
enough case, you will be removed from this country that you believe
to be your home, and forced to return to a country that you probably
have no connection to.
In Kim's case, his entire family was living in the United States,
and he had not been back to Korea since he was six years old. It is
hard to imagine what would become of someone who is deported and
who knows nothing and no one in the country of his origin. Worse
though, is the fact that Kim was not given a fair chance to develop
his case. Had he been better able to discuss his case with his attorney
and witnesses, perhaps he could have made a better argument to stay.
Also, if Kim is eventually removed from the United States and has to
leave behind all his friends and family, he will not have had the
opportunity spend his last days with them. 186 Despite the fact that he
has served the time for the crimes he committed, and even if he poses
no danger to the community or any flight risk, Kim will be held in a
prison until the day he is deported from the United States.
The protections of the Constitution which offer every American
the opportunity to be heard before they are deprived of their liberty,
were not offered to Kim. We as a nation are welcoming legal
permanent residents into our county, benefiting as a nation from their
work and existence in the United States, then failing to treat them as
our equals court. There is no reason to deny Kim the basic
Constitutional safeguards of getting a hearing before his freedom is
No such arbitrary power can exist where the principles involved in due process of
law are recognized. Id. at 101.
186. See Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that in
the case of an alien convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault, the "question
at hand ... is where he passes the time while waiting for the [removal] order to
become final. He says that he wants to spend it at home, with his.. .three children
who are U.S. citizens.").
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taken. Since he posed no flight risk or danger to society, the
government held Kim in violation of his rights against arbitrary and a
capricious detention. Kim has been denied the freedoms of a country
that at one time had welcomed him. Our Constitution has been
interpreted to provided due process protection to all those that stand
on American soil, but this case has made it clear that due process
applies differently in the case of legal permanent residents. It seems
to be a shame that America, "a nation of immigrants," has such a
poorly structured immigration system.'1 87
187. Salameda v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 70 F.3d 447, 452
(7th Cir. 1995).

